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AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

(20)

IN REPLY REFER TO

AD871337

AGDA (M) (18 Jun 70)

FOR OT UT 701231

25 June 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, US Army
Depot, Long Binh, Period Ending 31 January 1970

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
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Incl
as

Kenneth G. Wickham
KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY DEPOT, LONG BINH
APO 96332

AVCA SGN FD MGT

7 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, United States Army
Depot, Long Binh, Period Ending 31 January 1970

THRU: Commanding Officer
US Army Support Command, Saigon
ATTN: AVCA SGN GO S
APO US Forces 96491

TO: Department of the Army
Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Washington, D. C. 20310

1. OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES:

a. PLANS AND OPERATIONS:

(1) Construction:

(a) Two 48,000 Metal Warehouses at the Property Disposal Yard were completed 15 January and turned over to the depot on 22 January 1970. Total cost of construction was set at \$658,000. Other projects completed during the quarter were:

Operational lighting at the Class I Dry Stores Area, Trailer Transfer Point, Transportation Staging and Open Storage Area 4522 (\$400,000); 24,000 SF Maintenance and Storage Warehouse (\$360,000); 55,000 LF of water distribution system; wheel guards to protect doors at 24 warehouses; and 61,300 SY of Road Paving at the Main Depot Complex.

(b) Projects under construction are:

The 19,000 Security Fence and Lighting project (\$1,100,000) scheduled for completion 25 March 1970; Paving of depot parking areas around the Headquarters and the A Company Mess Hall, scheduled for completion 15 February 1970.

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(c) The following projects requested by the depot were disapproved or deferred by higher headquarters as not being essential:

120,000 SF Cement Storage Warehouse
212,000 SF Local National Mess Hall

1,530 SF Computer Storage Building
Cargo Checkout Lane
2 Fuel Distribution Facilities
Incinerator

(d) Two gate houses of modern design, which also serve as depot entrance identification, were completed and construction began on two others. Gate houses enhance the appearance of the depot and provide one of the most unique entrances found at any military complex in the theater.

(e) Other significant construction items of interest occurring during the quarter were:

Civilian Contractor completed repairs of the damaged door sills at the Class I Cold Storage Warehouse. Concrete had failed and hindered forklift operation through the doorways. Defective concrete was removed and replaced by handwood covered with a steel plate.

Cold Storage Warehouse project has been amended to add: Installation of 12 - 440 volt electrical outlets for Sealand Reefer Vans hook up; operational lighting for hardstand; packing areas on both sides; and preparation of railroad side to receive cargo vehicle traffic.

(f) Company C's Mess Hall has been reopened and Company F's closed for renovation due to unsanitary facilities.

(2) Packing and Crating: Eighteen thousand packing and crating items were constructed by the Box Shop during the quarter to support the depot storage and shipping operations. Lack of Pallet Kits causes pallets to remain the critical item in this operation. No kits were received from CONUS Supply sources. Requisitions are in for kits, and continued follow-up is made to expedite shipment.

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(3) Real Estate:

(a) The depot released 102,400 cu. ft. of freeze space on Long Binh Post with the full operation of the Cold Storage Warehouse at the depot. Additional Real Estate has been requested from Long Binh Post to provide a 343,000 SY expansion for the Property Disposal Yard.

(b) The Long Binh Post Exchange held the grand opening of the Depot Barber Shop on 6 January 1970. Four chairs in a comfortable setting provide a much needed convenience for depot personnel.

(4) Class I:

(a) Class I Cold Storage completed its consolidation by closing out the reefer section at its old location in Long Binh. With the entire operation now in one area, tighter controls have been implemented giving the customer faster and better support. Although pushed for storage space at times, the problem has been countered somewhat through skillful management on the part of all personnel. Additional electric MHE equipment obtained has also greatly enhanced rapid handling of freeze cargo.

(b) Cold Storage is proud of its "Vietnamization" program. Upon the recommendation of a manpower survey team, more Vietnamese have now been trained as forklift operators. It is hoped that as their skill level improves, the need for military drivers will be reduced. Many of the more educated workers have shouldered the responsibility of handling documentation and preparing daily reports. Currently, Vietnamese stock men are learning the principles of storage and stock rotation from their military supervisors.

(c) Class I Non-Perishable stocks of fruits and vegetables were moved from warehouse 711 to warehouse 615, which is much nearer the Class I recoup operation and should result in less use of MHE. Warehouse 711 will be restocked with less frequency of issue type items than are presently in temporary outside storage.

(5) ECMY:

(a) Per contract DAJB-1170-C-0096, the government anticipates that it will require the following scope of supply activities per month:

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	<u>1 Dec - 31 Mar</u>	<u>1 Apr - 30 Jun</u>
ASL Lines	3,500	3,500
Storage	100,000 S/T	80,000 S/T
Receipts	25,000 S/T	25,000 S/T
Issues	30,000 S/T	25,000 S/T
Rewarehouse	3,000 S/T	2,000 S/T
Recoup	2,500 S/T	2,500 S/T

(b) Performance for the months of December 1969 and January 1970:

	<u>Dec 69</u>	<u>Jan 70</u>
ASL Lines	5,378	5,629
Storage, Depot and customer assets:	150,334.9 S/T	140,059.2 S/T
Receipts	32,120.0 S/T	43,299.5 S/T
Issues	29,424.2 S/T	45,173.9 S/T
Rewarehouse	5,913.5 S/T	4,125.5 S/T
Recoup	3,126.0 S/T	3,211.0 S/T

(c) ECMY retrograded 427.9 S/T of excess materials during this reporting period.

(d) The cyclic inventory "Project Count Always" got under way on 8 October 1969; 3,128 lines have been inventoried. Dollar adjustments: over \$201,195.97; short, \$102,183.23; net gain, \$99,012.74.

(e) ECMY loaded and/or offloaded 14,278 trucks during the period, and received a total of 6,003.7 S/T of material by rail. Direct diversion from port was accomplished on 15,278.3 S/T of material.

(6) Contract Changes (COR for D/S&T):

(a) DAJB11-69-C-0014 covered operation and management of the Engineer Construction Materials Yard (ECMY), Care and Preservation Facility, and Deprocessing of Vehicles at Newport and Saigon Port. The contract expired 30 November 1969, except for deprocessing of vehicles at ports, which continued through 15 December 1969.

(b) In-storage maintenance and inspection of vehicles in the USADLB Vehicle Park became a part of the contract effective 13 October 1969.

(c) DAJB11-70-C-0096 for operation and management of the ECMY was awarded to Pacific Architects and Engineers, Inc., effective 1 December 1969. Care and Preservation was not included in this contract.

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(d) DAJB11-70-C-0099 for operation and management of the Care and Preservation activities was awarded to Vinnell Corporation effective 1 December 1969. This contract encompasses:

Preservation and packaging of Class II, VII (less vehicles and tactical bridges), and IX supplies.

Repacking and Recrating of Class I subsistence.

Repacking and Recrating of Class II, VII (less vehicles and tactical bridges), and IX supplies.

Inspection and In-Storage Maintenance of vehicles in the USADLB Vehicle Park.

(e) The 4th Transportation Command now administers the contract for deprocessing of vehicles at Newport and Saigon Port. A Vietnamese firm holds the contract.

(7) Equipment:

(a) Specialized equipment for baling of textiles, shipping electrical cables, and shearing metal or cable into manageable pieces, has been installed in Property Disposal.

(b) An inspection/dispatch operation for 1/4 ton vehicles has been instituted at the main depot, eliminating the 15 mile round trip to the ADLB Motor Pool on Long Binh Post for all 1/4 tons on 24 hour dispatch.

(c) Twenty-five Hyster, SRT, 4000# forklifts were received in exchange for Tow Motor, SRT, 4000# under current command exchange program.

(8) Depot Property: On 1 October 1969, S-4 Troop Command, US Army Depot, Long Binh began transferring all property to Depot Property Division, (IAW USARPAC directive stating only one property book would be authorized for the depot). The entire property book was laterally transferred by 31 October 1969. On 1 November 1969 the S-4, Troop Command was deactivated. With the addition of the S-4 property book a TA 50-901 DX facility was established to accommodate all the S-4 supported units.

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(9) DPU Activity:

(a) 3SVN version 3 was instituted.

(b) PA&E/USADLE have as yet been unable to get 200 KW generator operating satisfactorily.

(c) UNIVAC 1005 was phased out on 30 November 1969.

(d) Eight daily cycle sort jobs were moved from 7010 processing to 1401 or 1460 processing using SORT-7, an IBM utility sort program. Approximately 2-2 1/2 hours of 7010 time per cycle is saved by this technique.

(e) Military keypunch personnel were eliminated due to personnel shortages.

(f) Seventeen daily cycles were completed in November and 19 daily cycles were completed in December 1969, setting new records.

(g) DPU, Stock Control and Chief, Storage, jointly implemented a series of programs which are, in effect, a zero balance inventory system.

(10) Chaplain Supply Items:

(a) Revised plans were made in regard to turn-in of Chaplain supplies as units leave Vietnam. Specifically, all Chaplain supplies are to be hand carried to the Depot Chaplain. Previous policies of lateral transfer to other units of such items resulted in the need for replacement of many items because of lack of quality control at the time of transfer.

(b) A location survey was made during the quarter, enabling this section to locate Chaplain supplies which had inadvertently been sent to warehouses other than 317.

(11) Logistics:

(a) Stock Control (ECMY):

	<u>Transaction Line Items</u>		<u>Dollar-Value (Millions)</u>	
<u>Month</u>	<u>Rec</u>	<u>Issues</u>	<u>Rec</u>	<u>Issues</u>
November	2,683	4,667	15.2	8.7
December	2,178	4,487	8.0	7.4
January	<u>1,951</u>	<u>4,579</u>	<u>5.5</u>	<u>5.9</u>
TOTALS	6,812	13,733	28.7	22.0

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(b) Storage (ECHY):

<u>Month</u>	<u>Short Tons Received</u>	<u>Short Tons Issues</u>	<u>Short Tons Rwghsed</u>	<u>Depot Assets On Hand End of Month</u>
November	28,352.0	31,350.3	15,062.9	121,920.6
December	32,120.0	29,455.4	5,913.5	124,585.2
January	<u>43,299.5</u>	<u>45,173.9</u>	<u>4,125.5</u>	123,494.9
TOTALS	103,771.5	105,979.6	25,101.9	

(c) Storage: The Storage Division of USADLB continues to emphasize location surveys, research of warehouse denials, receipt processing and the shipping of material release orders. The in-storage maintenance, organizational maintenance, acceptance inspections and inspections prior to issue of wheeled vehicles are being performed by contractor. An in-storage quality inspection surveillance of chemical and paper products continues. The training of Local Nationals in all areas of the Storage Operation continues with outstanding results. Storage Division's activities at Area 208 moved into the new Depot.

(d) Transportation: Transportation Management Division has undergone a reorganization in order to implement a system for establishing positive control of staged cargo as it enters the Transportation Staging Area. This involved combining the Area 208 and the New Depot Documentation Sections, and relocating them at the Transportation Pad. This allows documentation and staging personnel to effect closer coordination in checking cargo against bookings. The new system has resulted in increased control of cargo.

b. PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION:

(1) Troop Command:

(a) Two hundred thirty children from Honai Orphanage were treated and presented gifts during the Thanksgiving and Christmas Holidays.

(b) There have been no casualties or loss of equipment due to hostile enemy activity during the past quarter.

(c) Forty Local National civilians were released from work due to RIF action.

(d) An average of 73.6 percent of the Depot assigned personnel received training monthly.

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(e) Eleven hundred eligible bunker guard personnel participated in night familiarization firing in preparation for possible TET activity.

(f) Troop Command received the SSC Reenlistment Award in December for achieving 109% of its quota.

(2) Depot Inspector:

(a) During the period ending 31 January, 25 requests for assistance were processed. In addition, one IG complaint was processed.

(b) All depot nonappropriated funds were inspected.

(c) A study of BWQ and BOQ Regulations, a study on depot pilferage, and inspections of sub-standard areas were conducted during this quarter.

(3) Safety:

(a) Safety Lectures and comprehensive safety surveys have helped to reduce the accident rates for the second quarter. Safety Lectures covered a variety of subjects and included causes and lessons learned from previous accidents. Safety surveys have uncovered unsafe conditions and unsafe acts before the occurrence of an accident.

(b) The depot improved its fire protection posture considerably with the addition of a PA&E Fire Detachment. The local detachment consists of one Fire Company with a Fire Engine, 2,000 Gal water tanker and eight personnel. Back up support is provided by the units located at Sanford Airfield and 199th Inf Bde.

(4) Management:

(a) USARPAC approved the USADLB reclama for 99 spaces. The MTDA-03 is being finalized for submission. As a consequence of Keystone Bluejay, the USADLB has turned in "excess" spaces from the MTDA-02, has conducted an LN Reduction-in-Force, and has otherwise been brought in line with the manpower survey. This action departed from the DA force planning process (TAADC) and brought the MTDA-03 configuration into being six to nine months ahead of schedule.

(b) Higher headquarters has directed numerous organizational adaptations which render the Manpower Survey obsolescent, notably as follows:

Development of a separate proposed TDA for Collection, Classification and Salvage (now under operational control of 79th Maintenance Battalion).

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Development of a "standard" provisional Property Disposal Company with proposed TO&E.

Assignment of cellular team BK for operation of a Class IV equipment pool.

Pending reductions in officer and enlisted authorizations to below that of MTDA-03 (ie., levy of spaces for SSC Infantry-type security companies).

These adaptations are in some cases necessary and/or desirable, so do not fall into Lessons Learned (Section 2).

(c) Twelve management analysis-type studies were completed during the period as a service to operating elements and/or to cope with problems and policy issues of depot-wide scope.

(d) Seven Cost Reduction actions were submitted during the period in support of 1st Logistical Command's "Project 100 Million". Only one validation had occurred at the end of the reporting period, pertaining to reuse of lumber at Sealand Dock.

(e) Pursuant to actions taken to increase depot responsiveness in processing and filling requisitions, the first completed survey under the Progress Measurement System has shown a reduction of 4 1/2 days to have occurred in average time required to process IPD 12 requisitions between August 69 - December 1969.

(f) The USADLB Command and Control Improvement Program (CCIP) was published in December 69. Seventy-three CCIP's programs having 1st Logistical Command and/or USASUPCOM, SGN Command emphasis, are applicable to the depot. Most have been implemented with progress toward objectives. Fifteen have been completed.

(5) ECMY:

(a) As of 31 January 1970, the assigned strength was 35 US, 65 TCN and 707 LNs. The new manning consisting of 36 US, 67 TCN and 717 LNs for operation of the ECMY, 1 December 1969 thru 31 March 1970, was approved by the US Army Procurement Agency Vietnam.

(b) The consolidation of the office of the contract manager and the Chief of ECMY resulted in the deletion of two US and two TCN spaces from the manning requirements. This is a saving of approximately 950 man-hours per month.

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(6) Review Boards Established: Two boards to enhance the facilities engineering and major construction programs at the depot were established during the quarter. The Job Order Review Board will meet monthly to review, recommend approval/disapproval and establish priorities of Job Order Requests (DA Form 2701) submitted by depot activities. The Depot Master Planning Board meets quarterly to determine major facilities required and necessary to accomplish the depot mission. Both boards make recommendations to the Depot Commander, who has the final approval of projects to be submitted to higher headquarters for action.

c. SECURITY OPERATIONS:

(1) Depot Defense Force: A Depot Defense Force has been organized utilizing on-duty depot personnel. All equipment necessary for the performance of their mission to support the Military Police Security Force is stored in the Military Police Security Operations Section. This equipment will be issued by means of pre-prepared hand receipts by the Military Police Security personnel when the force is mobilized.

(2) MP Patrols: Two Military Police Patrols have been equipped with M-60 Machine guns in order to establish a mobile reaction force within present resources. There is one gun-jeep patrol on New Depot and one in Area 208.

(3) New Gate: A new gate has been established at ADLB due to the construction of train tracks, which resulted in an opening in our perimeter.

2. LESSONS LEARNED: COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. PERSONNEL:

(1) Contract Changes (ECMY and Care and Preservation):

(a) Observation:

DAJB11-69-C-0014 was authorized 1,009 personnel for the ECMY operation. Effective 1 December 1969, the authorized staffing under contract DAJB11-70-C-0096 was reduced to 820 personnel as follows:

	<u>US</u>	<u>TCN</u>	<u>IN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
DAJB11-69-C-0014	50	82	877	1,009
DAJB11-70-C-0096	<u>36</u>	<u>67</u>	<u>717</u>	<u>820</u>
Net Reduction	14	15	160	189

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DAJB11-69-C-0014 was authorized 353 personnel for Care and Preservation activities. Excluding deprocessing of vehicles at ports, the Contractor employed 220 personnel. DAJB11-70-C-0099 prescribes a manning level of 132 personnel.

	<u>US</u>	<u>TCH</u>	<u>LN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
DAJB11-69-C-0014	8	34	178	220
DAJB11-70-C-0099	<u>4</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>102</u>	<u>132</u>
Net Reduction	4	8	76	88

(b) Evaluation: Two major aspects must be considered as regards contractor operations: (i) A significant change in workload, and (ii) competition among qualified contractors. In the first instance, the ECMY contract was reduced, through negotiation, on the basis of a decreased workload incident to troop reductions and fewer approvals of construction projects. In the second instance, Care and Preservation activities, this reduction was obtained by awarding the contract to the lowest qualified bidder, based on identical workload specifications.

(c) Recommendation: Continue to monitor contractor operations to enable prompt reaction to changes in workload and resource requirements resulting from changes in the tactical and logistical situation.

(2) Troop Command:

(a) Observation: With rapid changeover of officer personnel, it is difficult to insure continuity in planning and operations.

(b) Evaluation: Staff planning can be particularly difficult; if the S-2 and S-3 sections are combined, greater continuity and integration would be achieved.

(c) Recommendation: Combine the S-2 and S-3 sections (note: this has been accomplished since the last reporting period).

(3) Shortage of Personnel:

(a) Observation: An adequate number of personnel is not available to properly monitor the contractor removed operations of term scrap contracts in property disposal. Contractors have been found to be removing scrap material not covered in their contract.

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(b) Evaluation: The present large volume turn-in of serviceable and unserviceable end items and scrap material will probably continue for an extended period of time. Sufficient personnel from the existing work force will not be available to adequately perform the requirements of the contract.

(c) Recommendation: Expedite action to fill the existing vacancies in Property Disposal and assign additional personnel to monitor contractor operations and to assure conformance to contract provisions.

(4) Local National Security Guards:

(a) Observation: Local National female Security Guards are ineffective while searching other Local National female employees unless a system is established to double check their work. On several occasions we have discovered that our Local National female Security Guards have been accepting money in exchange for allowing female employees to exit ADLB with pilfered items taped under their clothing.

(b) Evaluation: The lack of US Forces female personnel to perform these duties makes it necessary to employ Local National, or Third Country National females to search the persons of female employees at our checkpoint. Due to the low economic background of most of our females, they are susceptible to accepting bribes to supplement their income. By utilizing a double check system in their presence they realize that by not performing their duties in the proper manner they might lose their basic means of income. Local Nationals and Third Country Nationals are also subjected to outside threats such as possible physical harm to members of their family or themselves if they perform their duties in the proper manner.

(c) Recommendation: That US Forces female personnel be obtained for the purpose of assisting Military Police. An alternate solution that we found effective was the utilization of mine detectors at the checkpoint to double check the search conducted by female Security Guards. Since implementing use of mine detectors on a permanent basis, female employees have all but ceased attempting to smuggle pilfered metal objects through the checkpoint.

b. INTELLIGENCE: None.

c. OPERATIONS:

(1) Zero Balance Inventory (SO6VB):

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(a) Observation: Zero Balance Inventory is concerned with managing fast moving and high turnover material. It is in effect, management by exception. Project Count Always, by contrast, is a total management system.

(b) Evaluation: Zero Balance Inventory is a simple system that appears to be an improvement over the Project Count Always system. Additional time is required to fully test and evaluate its effect.

(c) Recommendation: That interest in this system be generated in higher headquarters, to assist in evaluation.

(2) Paper in Short Supply for ADP:

(a) Observation: Two part, three part, four part, and five part paper is constantly in short supply and cannot be obtained through normal supply channels, in a timely manner.

(b) Evaluation: The paper is critical to computer operation and creates production problems when the supply diminishes. At times it is necessary to travel as far as Saigon to obtain paper. Resupply is then accomplished on a "Scrounge" basis.

(c) Recommendation: Those agencies responsible for procuring and shipping paper improve their service.

(3) Keypunch Backlog:

(a) Observation: The keypunch backlog is perpetuated by a lack of personnel and a large workload; plus the loss of the night shift.

(b) Evaluation: The backlog is unacceptable.

(c) Recommendation: Authorize or establish a night shift consisting of either military or Local Nationals (male only), with a minimum of 12 personnel.

(4) Generator:

(a) Observation: A 60 KW generator is required to operate the air conditioner for the Directorate if a power failure should occur.

(b) Evaluation: A test of the 200 KW generator was conducted on 17 January 1970. It was found that cyclic action (off and on) of the 40 ton air conditioner (used to cool the computer room) caused fluctuations in line power, causing the computer systems to fail.

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(c) Recommendation: PA&E representatives recommended the 40 ton air conditioner be disconnected from 200 KW generator line, rewired direct to commercial power, and special switch to be installed so that a mobile 60 KW generator can be positioned when need arises.

(5) Reactionary Force:

(a) Observation: Previously there was a rotating duty roster for the appointment of the Reactionary Force OIC.

(b) Evaluation: It was difficult for an officer to have adequate control and obtain efficiency (achieve tactical proficiency) in such a duty when served in only once every 30 - 40 days.

(c) Recommendation: Eliminate the Reactionary Force OIC duty roster (note: this has been done). A permanent Reactionary Force Officer has been placed in charge for better command and control. Suggest this remain a permanent position.

(6) Red Ball Requisitions:

(a) Observation: Red Ball requisitions received at depot level must receive maximum fill response, which can only be accomplished by applying all available assets. Several contributing factors result in assets appearing on the location file microfilm that are not on the ABF microfilm. Normally the ABF microfilm is used to determine availability of assets for release against emergency off-line MROs. Red Ball requisitions were being passed to USAICCV where the ABF microfilm file recorded a zero balance; however, the locator microfilm recorded a location.

(b) Evaluation: The assets appearing on the locator file microfilm often were processed to the computer ABF balance and available for computer response. The latest ABF microtape did not record these assets while a more current locator file did; therefore more off-line Red Ball releases could be made using the latest locator record for determination of available assets. This depot implemented use of the locator microfilm in determination of available assets for Red Ball release. A 26 percent increase in "Attempt-to-fill" resulted from the implementation.

(c) Recommendation: That all depots review the potential to increase Red Ball fill utilizing the latest locator record for determination of asset availability rather than the ABF.

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(7) Improvement of Location Surveys:

(a) Observation: Location Surveys could be taken utilizing pre-punched cards in lieu of listings.

(b) Evaluation: The use of the "CNT" and "STK" card will give a clearer overall picture of a storage site in that a card is furnished for each location. The "CNT" card, when annotated correct or delete along with any additions, generates a printout indicating all locations are correct, added and deleted. The "STK" card is furnished to be used as our up to date location placard.

(c) Recommendation: That the card survey be fully implemented and all personnel concerned be made aware of the advantages over previous procedures i.e., surveys expedited, less manhours expended, no longer necessary to prepare USADLB form 11's for deleted locations, and more comprehensive printouts.

(8) Transportation of APO Mail Items From Warehouses to Shipping Section:

(a) Observation: Problems were encountered keeping sufficient quantities of boxes on hand at storage locations for transporting small items to the Shipping unit. There was also a loss in processing time in storage location caused by multiple handling of containers used for this purpose.

(b) Evaluation: Transportation must be provided to ensure a continuous flow of supplies without losing processing time by continuous handling of containers. Warehouse trailers were modified by installing bird cages. Items are pulled from the lines and racks and placed in cages. When cage is filled, it is towed into the APO mail shipment section. This eliminates multiple handlings of boxes under the old system.

(c) Recommendation: Current system be continued and possibly expanded to include multipack items.

(9) Shipment of cargo by air and water:

(a) Observation: If a shipment of cargo misses a call forward for shipment, the TCMD is cancelled and the entire documentation process must begin again.

(b) Evaluation: Cancelling TCMDs for cargo that still requires shipment has a negative effect on order/ship time. Redocumentation

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results in another TDD being assigned to the shipment even though it has missed the original TDD assigned when the item was originally ready for shipment.

(c) Recommendation: When cargo misses a call forward, inquiry should be made as to why the cargo missed. If shipment is still required, the TCMD should be held open as "past TDD" and moved on the next available ships.

(10) Pallet Damage:

(a) Observation: The Non-Perishable Storage Section of Food Management Division continues to be greatly hampered by the receipt of damaged pallets. Some shipments have required repair to well over 50% of the pallets received. Skid boxes, such as are used to transport bags of flour, are especially susceptible to structural damage.

(b) Evaluation: The receipt of damaged pallets creates a backlog of work which is usually only partially alleviated by the time the next shipment arrives. Such receipts are a cause for concern simply for the vast amount of resources which must be spent in care and preservation activities.

(c) Recommendation: More care and supervision are required at port facilities during the loading and unloading of supplies. Skid boxes containing flour, etc. should be modified by placing pieces of wood perpendicular to the skids and connected to the bottoms of the skids. This type of arrangement is used on some skid boxes, and the condition of the boxes is far superior.

(11) Cyclic Inventory (ECMY):

(a) Observation: The continuous requirement to conduct special inventories during the planned and programmed cyclic inventory has created problems. Since 9 October 1969, this activity has been taxed with the requirement to conduct ten special inventories, generally on short notice, with insufficient time allocated. Examples: On 25 December 1969, a telephone call was received to inventory all lumber and report results to ICCV NLT COB 29 December 1969. This encompassed inventorying and preparing report for over nine million board feet of lumber within four days, whereas the cyclic inventory schedule allocated 10 days. At the time this requirement was received, there were already two open requirements pending, one for prefab buildings to be completed with results reported to ICCV NLT COB 29 December 1969; and

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one for nails with a completion date of ASAP. Before any of the above had been completed, a requirement was received to inventory sandbags, status "as of 31 December 1969". Special inventory requirements are sometimes received in the middle of a cyclic lot inventory. Due to the short suspense, the scheduled lot inventory must be suspended until completion of the special inventory.

(b) Evaluation: Special inventories disrupt the cyclic inventory process and negate the previous planning, preparation and control necessary for an accurate and valid inventory.

(c) Recommendations: That the ICCV and other interested headquarters review the published cyclic inventory schedule, and attempt to program their special inventory requirements; or that chapter 6 section II para 3.d. of LC Reg 700-31 dated 23 September 1969 be complied with.

(12) Contract Changes (Workload):

(a) Observation: The ECMY monthly workload did not decrease effective 1 December 1969 as estimated in contract DAJB11-70-C-0096.

	<u>Contract Estimate</u>	<u>Performance</u>	<u>Deviation</u>
Storage	100,000 S/T	145,197 S/T	+ 45.2%
Receipts	25,000 S/T	37,710 S/T	+ 50.8%
Issues	30,000 S/T	37,299 S/T	+ 24.3%
Rewarehouse	3,000 S/T	5,913 S/T	+ 97.3%
Recoup	2,500 S/T	3,168 S/T	+ 26.7%

The Care and Preservation contract DAJB11-70-C-0099 was awarded 30 November 1969, effective 1 December 1969. Performance was low in December 1969, but improved during January 1970, as shown below:

	<u>Contract Estimate</u>	<u>January 70 Performance</u>	<u>Deviation</u>
Recoup, Cl I	1,200 S/T	1,837 S/T	+ 53.1%
Recoup, Cl II, VII & IX	5,000 S/T *	2,105	- 58.0%
Preservation & Packaging, Cl II, VII & IX	60 S/T	55 S/T	- 8.3%

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	<u>Contract Estimate</u>	<u>January 1970 Performance</u>	<u>Deviation</u>
Vehicle Operations	2,320	2,460	+ 6.0%
Vehicle Maintained	540	1,216	+125.2%

*Note: The estimated workload is considered to be overstated. The FY 69 contract specified a monthly workload of 1,615 short tons of repacking and recrating Class II, VII & IX supplies.

(b) Evaluation: The ECMY workload increased rather than decreased as forecasted.

The late award was due to lack of receipt of approval of the Purchase Request and Commitment from USARPAC. This late award denied the Contractor the time necessary to mobilize his workforce.

(c) Recommendations:

Monitor contracts so as to enable prompt reaction to changes in workload and resource requirements.

Award contracts sufficiently in advance of the effective date to enable Contractor to mobilize his workforce and function effectively immediately upon commencement of the contract.

(13) Term Contracts (Scrap):

(a) Observation: The use of term contracts removal of scrap for one S.C.L. (Scrap Classification List) has not provided for the removal of sufficient quantities of each S.C.L.

(b) Evaluation: Scrap material is being generated in greater quantities than the monthly removals required in the current term contracts.

(c) Recommendation: That one time sales of scrap for one S.C.L. be used in conjunction with the term contracts to substantially reduce the on-hand inventory.

(14) Low or No Bid Sales Offering - Property Disposal:

(a) Observation: Items returning from sale action that were not sold due to low or no bids require additional manhours to resubmit for sale and must remain in the vehicular or bulk storage pads for an extended period of time.

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(b) Evaluation: Past experience indicates that little or nothing is gained by reoffering many items for sale. The cost of continued care and handling exceeds the monetary gain if any.

(c) Recommendation: That all items in this category be re-evaluated and only those items having a reasonable prospect of bringing an acceptable bid be reoffered for sale. All other items should be scrapped and immediately moved to the appropriate scrap storage pad.

(15) Excess Deficiencies In Roadside Spot Inspections:

(a) Observation: An excessive number of deficiencies were being reported by roadside spot inspection teams checking ADLB Materials Handling Equipment. Review of pre-dispatch inspection procedures indicated that additional emphasis was required in this area.

(b) Evaluation: The increased emphasis on pre-dispatch inspections and periodic technical inspections has up-graded the state of material readiness of the fleet. The entire fleet has been through the technical inspection cycle.

(c) Recommendation: Personnel supervising MHE must enforce compliance with procedures governing 1st and 2d echelon maintenance of the equipment. Continued emphasis on technical inspections is a necessity.

d. ORGANIZATION:

(1) Deletion of S-4 Section:

(a) Observation: There was duplication of effort between Troop Command's S-4 section and the Depot's Property Book Office.

(b) Evaluation: By deleting or consolidating efforts presently performed in two areas, a savings in personnel and equipment can be obtained.

(c) Recommendation: Delete the Troop Command S-4 Section from the TDA. (Note: This has been done. The S-4 duties are now under the Property Book Office at the depot).

e. PILOT PROJECT:

(a) Observation: Local Nationals can be utilized in the computer room, micromation room, and the tape library.

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(b) Evaluation: For one year a pilot project should be initiated to train Local Nationals in other areas than programming and keypunch. In the computer room, LNs would stock the various computer forms and cards, hang computer tapes, hang paper on the printers, prepare various run jobs and ultimately acquire skill as console operators. In the Micromation Room the LNs would work on the 4360 and operate the developer and copier. In the tape library, LNs would catalog, index, and cross-reference computer magnetic tapes, plus maintain a tape inventory.

(c) Recommendation: Attempt to obtain authority for additional LN authorizations in the computer areas specified above.

(2) Army Motor Vehicle Accidents:

(a) Observation: Recently a 37 passenger bus traveling on the 208 road turned over in the ditch on the side of the road. Extensive damage to the bus and serious injury to the driver and one passenger resulted.

(b) Evaluation: Investigation of the above accident revealed that the bus driver lost control of the bus due to a very slippery road. The road was treated with penepime and it had recently rained. Penepime roads are very oily and present a very serious hazard when wet.

(c) Recommendation: That extreme caution be used, and that increased emphasis must be placed on driving on this type of roadway, particularly during rainy weather.

(3) Local National Fatality (MHE):

(a) Observation: A forklift operator set forks down on a Local National employee, causing fatal injuries.

(b) Evaluation: Investigation of the accident revealed that the LN was sleeping under plastic and cardboard in an unauthorized area. It was further determined that the LN was not on an authorized break.

(c) Recommendation: That MHE operators closely observe the area where materials are to be placed before unloading materials; and that supervisors maintain closer control over employees to prevent unauthorized absence from place of duty.

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(4) Training of Depot Personnel:

(a) Observation: Grossly excessive manhours have been lost in the training of depot personnel in the company areas, due particularly to time/space factors (transportation requirements).

(b) Evaluation: To correct this loss of manhours, the common subjects training site was moved to the depot. Many manhours have been saved and the percentage of personnel trained has increased considerably.

(c) Recommendation: That training be continued to the maximum extent at the depot, utilizing the last hour of the day, Monday through Thursday.

(5) Instruction in MHE:

(a) Observation: Many American operators have been replaced by Local Nationals. It appears that the LN operators need to be very closely supervised. In addition, special efforts are being made to license as many LNs as possible.

(b) Evaluation: Operators require constant supervision to minimize accidents, unsafe acts, and abuse of MHE.

(c) Recommendation:

That supervisors insure operators to be properly trained and licensed.

Close personal supervision is exercised. Periodic checks be conducted by Safety Officer.

(6) Cross Training In Disposal Operations:

(a) Observation: The need for cross training is continual in order to provide adequate flexibility of assigned personnel.

(b) Evaluation: To reduce heavy or uneven workloads, and provide for reassignment of personnel as demands dictate, all personnel must be trained in all phases of the disposal operation.

(c) Recommendation: Training can be accomplished on the job training, in a continuous manner.

f. LOGISTICS:

(1) Container Break Bulk Point:

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(a) Observation: Containers with mixed loads for units and activities within III and IV CTZ are being shipped to ADLB for Trans-shipment.

(b) Evaluation: Containers are received at Newport. If the container has a mixed load, it is shipped to ADLB where it is unstuffed and then shipped to various locations within III & IV CTZ. Experience has shown that 44% of the cargo is for customers in the Saigon area, or must return to Saigon for shipment to the customer. This has a negative impact on order/ship time and wastes money moving cargo back and forth over the same route.

(c) Recommendation: That containers with mixed loads be unstuffed at Newport, with loads consolidated there, and shipped directly to customers.

(2) Sea Land Services:

(a) Observation: Receipt of perishable cargo by Sea Land Vans greatly enhances the Cold Storage Operation.

(b) Evaluation: Products received via Sea Land are much preferred to those arriving by reefer ship. In addition to quality being protected under Sea Land's contract agreement, products arrive segregated by item, without pilferage and by accurate count. Workload can be better managed as Sea Lands can be called in according to items needed, as they arrive in-country.

(3) Contract Changes (GFE):

(a) Observation: The Schedule "B" of Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) is inadequate for Care and Preservation contract DAJB11-70-C-0099. This stems from two causes:

Adding new functions to the contract to include in-storage maintenance and inspection of vehicles, for which equipment requirements were not included in the Request for Quotation.

Under omnibus contract DAJB11-69-C-0014, sufficient vehicles and equipment were available in the Central Equipment/Motor Pool to satisfy equipment requirements. Only limited items and quantities of GFE were specifically earmarked for C&P activities.

(b) Evaluation: GFE is not adequate to perform the workload and functions specified in the contract. This situation adversely affects qualitative and quantitative performance.

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(c) Recommendations:

That efforts be intensified to provide necessary GFE to FAJBL-70-C-0099.

That the Contracting Officer be immediately advised of overages or shortages of GFE in existing and potential contracts.

(4) Operator's Maintenance:

(a) Observation: Vehicle operators often fail to maintain their vehicles properly.

(b) Evaluation: Due to the urgency of the mission, commanders are placing a low priority on maintenance of vehicles. Concern is shown for the readiness of vehicles primarily as their equipment is deadlined.

(c) Recommendation: That commanders at all levels be reminded that without a sound maintenance program, they cannot properly accomplish their mission. When the Preventative Maintenance Program is carried out properly, the need for extensive second and third echelon maintenance will be drastically reduced.

g. COMMUNICATIONS:

(1) Depot Quarterly Back Order Reconciliation Report:

(a) Observation: The Quarterly Back Order Reconciliation Report was not producing the desired reaction from depot customers. An analysis was made to ascertain the degree and effectiveness of the customer's validation and response. It was disclosed that this ranged from no cancellation action or response in some cases to moderate reaction. Overall customer response and percentage of cancellation was not satisfactory. The value of this reconciliation under proper response was being disregarded in command channels.

(b) Evaluation: When the fifth 3SVN Quarterly Reconciliation was dispatched, special emphasis was placed on bringing the importance of the reconciliation to the attention of commanders of the customers as well as the customer. In this regard, the following method was employed:

A special letter signed by the Depot Commander was forwarded to the commander of each customer. The letter highlighted the significance of the reconciliation and requested his support.

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Special bulletins and Depot Newsletters sent to the customer urged that his review be thorough and his reply be within the suspense period.

Complete instructions accompanied each reconciliation. The above produced excellent results.

(c) Recommendations:

All depots employ the procedures mentioned above.

The command include a review of reconciliation response during Inspector General and Instruction and Assistance Team visits.

All echelons of the command place special emphasis on assuring all back orders on the reconciliation are validated. The necessity for an up-tight response becomes more important each day as the command progresses towards Vietnamization.

(2) Resolution of Problems in Class I Support:

(a) Observation: In order to better serve depot customers, it appears that a deeper understanding is needed of special problems faced by both recipient and supporter.

(b) Evaluation: Reports of damaged products received, lack of variety in the menu, and products being returned due to lack of storage space or overabundance indicate that there is a need for better liaison between customer and supporter. A mutual exchange of visits involving key individuals within each segment of the operations concerned could stimulate ideas and prevent major problems from arising.

(c) Recommendation: That greater emphasis be given to liaison visits between supporting units and customers.

h. MATERIAL: None.

i. OTHER:

(1) Pilferage on USADLB:

(a) Observation: Local National employees have been attempting to smuggle pilfered items from Depot by concealing them in the buses utilized to transport them to the checkpoint. After being processed through checkpoint the Local Nationals reload the buses and are transported home. Local Nationals have become more and

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more sophisticated in the methods of concealment. They have disassembled portions of the bus while enroute from the depot to the checkpoint. The Local National bus drivers are aware of this because the latest location utilized to conceal items is a box between the driver's seat and the first passenger seat.

(b) Evaluation: Since mine detectors are used at the checkpoint, minimizing the possibility of smuggling items through checkpoint, the Local Nationals are attempting other methods to get the pilfered items off depot. As Military Police, with the aid of informants, find new hiding places, the Local Nationals are forced to select other hard-to-get-at locations.

(c) Recommendation: That the use of mine detectors be extended and methods to develop Local National informants be devised at USADLB and considered for other depots.

1 Incl
as

John W. Irving
JOHN W. IRVING
Colonel, QMC
Commanding

AVCA 31-2-3 (7 Feb 70) 1st Ind

Subject: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, US Army Depot, Long Binh, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RUS CSFCH-65 (R2)

1. To Army Support Command, Saigon, APO 96491 6 MAR 1970

2. Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA GO-4H,
APO 96384

1. Reference paragraph 2a(3), page 11. CONCUR. Information available to this office indicates PDO is authorized 11 (eleven) officers, 1 (one) warrant officer, and 145 (one hundred forty five) enlisted men, and that 3 (three) officers, 0 (zero) warrant officers and 93 (ninety three) enlisted men are assigned. During the period 1-16 February 1970, 17 (seventeen) enlisted men were assigned to Company 1, USA Depot, LBN for duty with PDO. Additional personnel will be assigned as soon as they become available. In view of the recent reduction in space requirements for USADLB, recommend the personnel formerly assigned to those spaces be assigned to PDO to alleviate the problem mentioned in para 2a(3) of the ORLL.

2. Reference paragraph 2a(4), page 12. CONCUR. Female security guards are definitely necessary to search female LN employees as they exit the Depot. As long as LN female security guards are utilized in this capacity, instances of bribery and intimidation will continue to be a problem. The need for at least two US Forces females to double check the work of LN searchers would be an invaluable aid to Depot security personnel and should be considered immediately.

3. Reference paragraph 2c(1), page 12. CONCUR. This matter has been brought to the attention of 1st Logistical Command, which then requested additional information be furnished to analyze the significance of the program run (SO6VB). The information was furnished by Long Binh Depot on 9 Feb 1970.

4. Reference paragraph 2c(2), page 13. CONCUR. Although this headquarters is in no way responsible for procuring the paper, the shortage was brought to the attention of the ICCV. The ICCV has increased the requisitioning objective of the depot, thus enabling it to stock more of the paper than was previously authorized. At the same time the ICCV submitted an emergency requisition to CONUS in order to increase the stockage position of all Depots in RVN.

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5. Reference paragraph 2c(13), page 18. CONCUR. The use of lot sales, to reduce the scrap inventory, is a recommendation made by this staff section to 1st Log in this month's Commander's Conference.

6. Reference paragraph 2c(14), page 18. CONCUR. The FDO is presently downgrading 3.6 million dollars worth of usable property to scrap. This action is due to a lack of sales after this property has been up for sale two or more times.

7. Reference paragraph 2e, page 19. CONCUR. IC TRNG DIR NO 1 gives approval to the concept of training ADP technicians from the LN work force. Contact should be made with 1st Log Headquarters in accordance with the guidance made in the cited Directive.

8. Reference paragraph 2f(1) page 21. NONCONCUR. The depot has an operable transportation pad for the collection of cargo for most of the consignees which are included in the mixed van loads. The addition of the break bulk cargo increases the rate at which truck load (trailer load) lots are generated, thereby reducing order and ship time to many smaller consignees both for the break bulk cargo and depot originated shipments. The port deals primarily with "wholesalers" rather than "retailers" or smaller consignees. The generation rate of truck load lots to the smaller consignees would be erratic at the port, since most cargo transiting the port is marked for the Depot or major consignees. The establishment of a break bulk point at Newport would operate at cross-purposes with the principle of clearing the port as rapidly as possible, and would slow the delivery of cargo to the consignees.

9. Lessons Learned, observations, and recommendations are concurred in by this command with the above exception.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LBN 2604

OP:
USADL


MICHAEL D. HUSTON
CPT AGC
ASST AG

AVCA GO-MH (7 Feb 70) 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the US Army Depot, Long Binh
for period ending 31 Jan 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384 4 APR 1970

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, US Army Depot, Long Binh for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 is forwarded.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning shortage of personnel, page 11, paragraph 2a(3). Concur. Saigon Support Command has stated additional personnel will be assigned as soon as they become available. It is imperative that the PDO Company be brought to full strength as rapidly as possible to insure sufficient personnel to properly safeguard and process property. Lacking proper supervision, contractors have and will continue to pilfer disposal assets. This headquarters has instructed all support commands to staff the PDO to accommodate the disposal workload within the framework of the proposed TDA.

b. Reference item concerning local national security guards, page 12, paragraph 2a(4). Concur. The utilization of US Forces female personnel coupled with the mine detectors at the checkpoint would certainly increase the deterrent factor. This headquarters has previously attempted to acquire WAC personnel to search LN females at the depot checkpoints. Recommend re-evaluation by higher headquarters.

c. Reference item concerning zero balance inventory (SO6VB), page 12, paragraph 2c(1). Concur. This has been accomplished and all Army depots will be standardized in the operation of this program.

d. Reference item concerning keypunch backlog, page 13, paragraph 2c(3). The Directorate of Data Processing presently has a total of 23 IBM 029 Card Punch machines and 11 IBM 059 Verifiers. The machines are operated by local national females on the day shift with good results. However, the use of local national females to operate on the night shift is not advisable for security and other reasons. Male personnel of the proper caliber are not available. Enlisted positions were set up on the night shift, however it is difficult to keep a trained group of enlisted men to do the keypunching. With military duties and details they are generally on the job only about two days out of three. While not identical, a similar situation exists at the other depots. A possible solution would be to lease more keypunch machines and hire more local nationals to operate them on the day shift. Recommend evaluation by higher headquarters.

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e. Reference item concerning Red Ball requisitions, page 14, paragraph 2c(6). Concur. This will be brought to the attention of each depot by the Instruct and Advise teams of this headquarters.

f. Reference item concerning improvement of location surveys, page 15, paragraph 2c(7). Concur. This is now built into the Standard Supply System in Vietnam.

g. Reference item concerning shipment of cargo by air and water, page 15, paragraph 2c(9). Nonconcur. If a shipment misses a call forward and thereby misses transportation assets to which it has been assigned, TMA and MCC cancel the offering under current regulations. Cancelling offerings does not have a negative effect on OST standards, missing call-forwards does. Under OST standards as outlined in MACV 55-4, there is no justification in holding transportation responsible for cargo being past OST when supply has missed the original call-forward and subsequent movement of the cargo. Recommend current procedures remain in effect.

h. Reference item concerning pallet damage, page 16, paragraph 2c(10). Concur. A message is being sent to all support commands to insure that more care and supervision is accomplished at facilities during loading and unloading. Consolidated containers, AMCS 746-5 Cleated Plywood type, are provided with perpendicular wood stringers.

i. Reference item concerning cyclic inventory, page 16, paragraph 2c(11). Concur. However, there will be occasions where out-of-cycle physical inventories are required. The inventories cited were results of special requirements given to the ICCV. Efforts to adhere to the cyclic inventory schedule as much as possible, will continue to be made.

j. Reference item concerning contract changes, page 17, paragraph 2c(12). Concur. PR&C's for FY 71 that require USARPAC approval have been submitted through USARV to USARPAC. No delays are anticipated for awarding of FY 71 contracts.

k. Reference item concerning term contracts (scrap), page 18, paragraph 2c(13). Concur. The recommendation by Saigon Support Command in 1st indorsement, to use lot sales to reduce scrap generations in excess of those quantities released under existing term contracts is an appropriate one. Action has been taken by this headquarters to effect such sales.

l. Reference item concerning low or no-bid sales offerings - property disposal, page 18, paragraph 2c(14). Concur. Action taken by Saigon Support Command is appropriate. This headquarters recently received authority to conduct negotiated sales on low or no-bid items. This expedited procedure for marketing property should further reduce the present inventory.

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m. Reference item concerning pilot project, page 19, paragraph 2e(1). Concur. Authority for additional LNDH authorization to support a documented training program must be requested of this headquarters. Coordination by this headquarters with the Training and Development Division, OCPD, HQ, USARV would then be effected to obtain authorization for support of the training program. All Intern Programs and Pilot Projects within an ADP environment must be coordinated with CO, USAICCV and Special Assistant for Data Systems, this headquarters.

n. Reference item concerning Sea-Land services, page 22, paragraph 2f(2). Nonconcur. Advantages of containerization as they apply to compatible cargo are self-evident. However, when COMSTS-Washington decided to eliminate two break-bulk reefer ships from RVN service, the resulting schedule was unsatisfactory to Class I commodity managers and a meeting had to be called to modify it. The present schedule represents the maximum containerization possible with available assets. Nonconcur with elimination of present reefer break-bulk assets until such time as containerized reefer shipments are able to provide the service required by the command.

o. Reference item concerning contract changes (GFE), page 22, paragraph 2f(3). Concur. Contracting officer is aware of the status of GFE at USAD, LBN for the contract. Measures are being taken to obtain more equipment.

p. Reference item concerning depot quarterly back order reconciliation report, page 23, paragraph 2g(1). Concur. A message was sent to all depots explaining Long Binh depot's success in customer reconciliation and requesting special interest be placed during Instruct and Advise and Inspector General visits.

q. Reference item concerning pilferage on USADLB, page 24, paragraph 2i(1). Concur. However, the mine detectors have not been as successful as previously envisioned. Mechanical problems and the non-pilfered metal objects both worn and carried by the local nationals cause continuous false readings, sometimes rendering the detector useless. There is a need for military police personnel, both US and ARVN, to closely scrutinize and search buses and passengers prior to their departure.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the US Army Depot, Long Binh
for period ending 31 Jan 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

3. Concur with the basic report as modified by this and previous indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LBN 4862


M. E. CLARK
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

CF:
USASUPCOM, SGN
USAD, LBN

20 APR 1970

AVHGC- DST (undated) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, United States Army Depot,
Long Binh, for Quarterly period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS:
CSFOR-65 (R2)

Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 from Headquarters, United States Army Depot, Long Binh and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Management", page 8, paragraph b(4): The Depot is to be commended for efficient resources management allowing for reduction of requirements six to nine months ahead of schedule.

b. Reference item concerning "Local National Security Guards", page 12, paragraph a(4); paragraph 2, 1st Indorsement; paragraph 2b, 2d Indorsement: nonconcur. Non-allocated personnel space resources and limited female billeting facilities preclude the procurement of additional enlisted women to perform search duties. Unit has been advised to address this matter by separate correspondence.

c. Reference item concerning "Paper in Short Supply for ADF", page 13, paragraph c(2): concur. Actions taken by the ICCV will eliminate future shortages. The first shipment of expedited paper requisitions are scheduled to arrive in RVN around the middle of May 1970. No further action is required.

d. Reference item concerning "Keypunch Backlog", page 13, paragraph (d)(3): nonconcur in the authorization of 12 spaces. An average backlog of 7000 to 8000 cards per day, or 225,000 per month exists. The USARPAC Survey Team recognized a production of 35,149.6 per person per month. Thus a requirement exists, based on current backlog, of seven additional spaces. However, this backlog is not the basic Depot mission for 3SVN requirements. It is the Depot keypunch workload in support of machine time utilized by other organizations. Staffing for such an unpredictable workload is of questionable merit. Evaluation of the submission of a Manpower Requirement Change (MRC) by concerned organizations would consider all aspects. Unit has been requested to submit MRC's by separate correspondence. Concur in the recommendation for shifts. This has considerable merit and should be pursued. By establishing a second and perhaps a third night shift, not only will the backlog in keypunching be controlled, but more efficient

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utilization of leased IBM card punch machines can be realized. The added expense of wages for local nationals can be offset by reducing the machines required. Each card punch machine rents for approximately \$81.00 per month with an anticipated rent/maintenance cost of \$101.00 per month beginning 1 July 1970. Further, an increase in personnel for night shift, if accomplished by local nationals, would provide a greater training base toward the Vietnamization of the logistics operations in the depots.

e. Reference item concerning "Cyclic Inventories", page 17, paragraph c(11): concur with basic recommendation as modified by paragraph 21, 2d Indorsement. Normally, these special inventories are required as a result of a warehouse denial or emergency requirements to provide 100% inventory accuracy of a specific item. No further action is required.

f. Reference item concerning "Contract Changes", page 17, paragraph c(12): concur in the observations submitted by US Army Depot Long Binh. Contract estimates are submitted by the requiring activities and adjustments should be made on the FY 71 contract. The late award of this contract was caused by failure to submit complete requirements packages well in advance of proposed starting date of the contract. Advanced procurement planning on the part of the requesting organization will prevent future delays.

g. Reference item concerning "Deletion of S4 Section", page 19, paragraph d(1): concur. One space recognized by survey team should be withdrawn and returned to the data bank. The additional authorizations included in TDA P5W023AA01 at paragraph 10, line 8 and paragraph 10, line 12 should be returned to Headquarters, USARV Debit-Credit Account. Unit has been so advised.

h. Reference item concerning "Pilot Project", page 19, paragraph e(1): concur. Consideration should be given to depots and the USAICCV to gradually provide an increasing base of local nationals who are skilled in the operation of peripheral equipment and computer console and tape handling functions. In the Vietnamization of the logistics effort, it is essential that some program begin now for the long range training of selected qualified local nationals in these skills. This should be an ever increasing area of interest, because training of this nature cannot be conducted on a short-fuse crash basis. It will take time to work the trainees from one type of equipment to the more complex equipment and operations. Those demonstrating the aptitude and achievement should be advanced under a definite program. This type of training action should be implemented. Unit has been so advised.

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i. Reference item concerning "Sea Land Services", page 22, paragraph f(2): concur with the basic comments concerning the advantages of Sealand Reefer Service. However as the 2d Indorsement points out, no further expansion of this service is now possible with present assets. As further troop withdrawals reduce the Class I requirement, more of the total reefer cargo will be able to be supplied by container.

j. Reference item concerning "Pilferage at USADL", page 24, paragraph i(1) and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2q: concur. As pilferage is brought under control, security guards may tend to become lax and unaware of new methods being used to smuggle articles out of USADLB. Security guards should be given this equipment to aid in their searches and must remain alert to new methods and hiding places used to smuggle goods. No action by DA or USARPAC necessary.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Cy furn:

1st Log Comd

US Army Depot, Long Binh



D. J. WINTER
1LT, AGC

Assistant Adjutant General

GPOP-DT (7 Feb 70) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ US Army Depot, Long Binh for Period
Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 19 MAY 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310


1. This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.
2. Reference paragraph 2d, 3d Indorsement and paragraph 2c,(3), page 13
of subject ORLL. This headquarters will take necessary action upon
receipt of Manpower Requirements change.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

D.D. Cline

D.D. CLINE
2LT, AGC
Asst AG

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
UNITED STATES ARMY DEPOT, LONG BINH, VIETNAM



UNCLASSIFIED

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